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POLICY STATEMENT
BY
THE DEMOCRATIC ADVISORY COUNCIL

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A NATIONAL PEACE AGENCY

1. Introduction

The United States has constantly attempted to reduce the intensity of the arms race with the general objective of providing a rational world security system by means other than sheer strength in military weapons, forces and alliances. Unfortunately, these efforts have not met with success despite fourteen years of disarmament negotiations within the United Nations.

However, on August 20, 1958 a first major breakthrough in these disarmament negotiations occurred when the technical experts of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union together with other states reached agreement in Geneva on the technical feasibility and structure of an international nuclear test monitoring system.

It is significant that the various technical components of the detection system agreed upon were based upon essentially new technology or applications of technology which had not been highly developed during the previous decade. It became clear at this time that the impact of science and technology on the possibilities for arms limitation agreements between nations was probably as immense as it had already been upon the development of new weapons of destruction.

The progress reflected in this epoch-making agreement was subsequently jeopardized when, after the 1958 Geneva talks, new experimental evidence indicated that the previously agreed upon inspection system would not adequately detect underground explosions. The latter system was based in part upon essentially inadequate experimental evidence derived from a single underground nuclear explosion. The inadequacy of the data became apparent to U.S. experts after they analyzed experimental evidence gained from additional underground tests of nuclear explosions. Until recently the Russians have rejected these new technical data, but they have now finally agreed to study formally these data jointly with the United States and the United Kingdom. We may again hope that the technical teams of all participating nations will be able to reach a new agreement on the feasibility and structure of a nuclear test inspection system.

Further experiments with nuclear test detection systems coupled with an allied research and development program of high urgency and priority can be projected to yield additional technical evidence on the reliability of all kinds of inspection systems which may give all nations a greater sense of security with regard to disarmament agreements.

In the interim since the 1958 agreement between the technical experts on the technical feasibility of an inspection system, the leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have reemphasized their interest and willingness to negotiate various kinds of disarmament and arms limitations agreements.

Our government is doing its best within the limits of its present organization to respond to the involved technical demands of future negotiations in the nuclear test suspension and arms limitation areas. However, at the present time, we are not adequately organized in the Executive Branch of the Government to take advantage of the opportunities presented us to reach peaceful agreements during this new era.

2. Need for Urgency

Our immediate danger results from the fact that the United States and the USSR have built up sufficient nuclear striking power to effectively destroy the economic and military power of each other. Unfortunately, the defense requirements of each nation continue to mount as modern science and technology develop new deterrent and counter-deterrent systems. We have no present alternative but to continue to invest heavily in new weapon systems with the rather sure knowledge that this investment does not buy us additional security, but merely permits us to maintain our position in the arms race. As the future unfolds, this apparent balance of military power between the United States and the USSR is very likely to be disturbed as other nations acquire nuclear capability.

During the past two decades science and technology have revolutionized the nature of warfare and have been largely responsible for the existing unstable power relationship between nations. The hope persists in many quarters that in the next decade science and technology will once again produce for us a decisive weapons advantage such as the United States enjoyed during the first post-war decade. This possibility is, unfortunately, a remote one. There appears to be no way to invent our way out of the grave danger that we face through the development of military systems alone. At best, the science and technology of ourselves and the USSR, supported in the most lavish manner conceivable, can only provide a continuing stalemate in the arms race.

(more)

The achievement of an arms stalemate is complicated by a highly dangerous condition. During the next decade the nuclear "club" which is now arrayed in a bi-polar military power complex may be enlarged to include as many as ten or more nations arranged in a multi-polar power complex.

Three nations now possess a nuclear weapons capability, coupled with the means of delivering these weapons. In the near future, a fourth nation (probably France) will conduct its nuclear weapons test and will shortly thereafter qualify as a nuclear power. It is not clear at this moment whether the emergence of France as a nuclear power would preserve the relative simplicity of the bi-polar nuclear power equation of the world. In the event that the fourth or fifth nation to possess nuclear weapons is Communist China, the vastly more complex problems of a multi-polar international power equation will confront us and the relative simplicity of our present world situation will then be evident.

Agreements in regard to the limitation of the testing, use and production of nuclear weapons must be reached at the earliest possible date before this multi-polar situation develops and while the nuclear "club" is still small. These agreements, when accomplished, will be only the beginning of a vast and complex continuing effort to insure world peace through international agreements. Such agreements cannot be based upon trust alone so that the very essence of our ability to come to an agreement must depend upon the feasibility and reliability of international inspection systems. Technical adequacy is, and will be, the limiting factor in the dependability of such inspection systems and therefore a major research and development effort in the support of the development of these systems is mandatory.

Time is rapidly running out. It is absolutely vital that we organize our best thinking and processes of government so that our science and technology can be applied with all of its resourcefulness and ingenuity to devising solutions to the most challenging problem man has ever faced -- the maintenance of peace. A National Peace Agency is proposed as an independent governmental agency to explore

the technical possibilities of inspection systems, develop new arms limitation concepts, and become a strong factor in disarmament planning. Such an agency marshalling the scientific talent of this country and drawing upon its technical resources offers the possibility of making giant strides toward the development of a rational world security system.

3. Inspection and Intelligence as a Substitute for Trust

Our present national policy requires that international arms limitation agreements must be supported by international inspection systems to provide the necessary assurance against violations. We have tended to demand that such inspection systems provide 100 per cent certainty of detecting violations. The risk attending the acceptance of arms limitation agreements has been viewed as demanding a 100 per cent assurance system. The general reasonableness of this position must be explored and thoroughly studied by a research project within a National Peace Agency.

Under the conditions of the present arms race, the effectiveness of our intelligence indicators and intelligence systems are our principal reassurances that we are maintaining parity in our deterrent weapons systems and they also form our main assurance against surprise attack. A similar situation must exist within the Soviet Union in this respect. Clearly, their intelligence gathering systems are as vital a part of their national security as are ours.

The acceptance of arms limitations agreements with adequate technical inspection in no way suggests that the participating nations will diminish their intelligence efforts. Rather, the contrary may be true. However, it seems equally clear that the Geneva negotiations on suspension of nuclear tests have indicated that both sides are beginning to understand that inspection systems, plus hard intelligence information, can in fact provide the substitute for trust so badly needed to catalyze the dynamics of progress in disarmament.

4. Capitalizing Peace

Exploding technology in agriculture, public health, engineering and communications has created expectations of a new and better life for even the most underdeveloped nations of the world.

Hope can realistically exist among these nations that modern science and technology can provide a time-bridge so that the rate of change from a fairly simple to an industrial society can be vastly accelerated. Each society no longer has to repeat the slow evolutionary history of all prior societies to accomplish this change. Given technological leadership, education and access to capital goods, these nations can emerge from the twilight zone of existence with its mass illiteracy and the ever-present spectre of famine and a medieval death rate.

It is not enough to apply our organized scientific resources to the problem of neutralizing the military forces of war. We must also strive to capitalize these resources while maintaining peace by organizing to apply them to new positive programs for improving the economic lot of the underdeveloped nations of the world.

This is a logical extension of the Point IV concept of technical cooperation introduced by President Truman in 1949. A major task of the National Peace Agency will be to provide technical leadership in this area.

5. Present Government Organization for Peace

The existing governmental machinery for application to the specific problems of promoting peace through international agreements on arms limitations is seriously inadequate. It consists of the following: An Ambassador and a limited staff currently assigned to the Geneva negotiations on test suspension; a State Department office known as the Special Assistant for Arms Limitation (it includes a total of approximately twenty personnel); a section in the Office of the Secretary of Defense known as the Office for International Security Affairs (it consists of a small staff of professional people with part-time experts drawn from the three

military services). The Services themselves do not have formal offices engaged full-time in the exploration of arms limitation problems, possibilities or policies; the general pattern is to assign military intelligence personnel to such activities on an ad hoc basis.

Recently, the President appointed a special study group known as the Joint Disarmament Study under Mr. Charles Coolidge. This temporary group reports to the Secretary of State and is assigned the task of reviewing our national disarmament policy in the light of modern technology and the existing international climate. The Coolidge organization consists of 18 people, including a small group of consultants. In addition, the Coolidge study group is assisted from time to time by the staff of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, Dr. George Kistiakowsky.

Dr. Kistiakowsky and his predecessor, Dr. James R. Killian, have authorized various special studies on disarmament, detection of surprise attack, test suspension and other phases of the disarmament problem. These studies have been carried out largely by scientists working on a part-time basis. All in all, the present government machinery for peace consists of the part-time efforts of a small number of people and the full time efforts of a handful of experts.

While the government has long understood the need to generate special organizations to resolve the problems of defense, it has not yet generated a single special organization to explore the problems of peace. Our overall national defense budget, including atomic funds and appropriations for foreign military aid, runs in excess of $44 billion, but there is no substantial separate appropriation for meeting the peace needs of our time. Large sums of money are spent by the Defense Department for the analysis of technical problems in the defense area. For example, the Air Force supports considerable analytical research through the offices of the RAND Corporation; the Army assigns technical problems to the Office of Research Operations (Johns Hopkins University) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

support the Institute for Defense Analyses. Yet the United States has no facility or separate organization for dealing with equally complex technical "peace problems". A great urgency exists for the establishment of such an independent organization.

6. The National Peace Agency

We propose that a New Federal agency be established to be known as the National Peace Agency. This agency will report directly to the President in much the same way as does the Atomic Energy Commission. It will work in close collaboration with the Departments of State and Defense. Its basic objectives will be to deal with problems related to achieving peace through arms limitation agreements, to developing international control and inspection systems and to applying scientific and technical resources to advancing the living standards of peoples in the underdeveloped nations of the world.

This Agency will be dramatic proof to the world that the United States is sincere in its desire for peace and disarmament and arms limitations agreements. Clearly, the United States can not force arms limitations agreements and inspection systems on other nations, but by taking the initiative and by applying leadership in science and technology, it can open the way to the solution of these problems.

The National Peace Agency would consist of a Director, his Deputy and the necessary organization to administer and support a peace program on a scale which will be comparable with that of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. It will be staffed by professionally-trained personnel who will dedicate their careers to the area of developing a technology for peace. The Agency will establish and staff a permanent Laboratory for Peace where it will develop and administer its research and study programs. In this connection the Agency will contract with educational and research institutions, both domestic and foreign, to take maximum advantage of the world's scientific and intellectual resources. As far as

possible all research efforts of the Agency will be performed on an unclassified basis to promote the free flow and exchange of new ideas and concepts in the new technology of peace research and development. Certain members of the Agency must, however, have broad clearance for access to classified information in the various agencies of the government, including the Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. These agencies along with others, such as the International Cooperation Administration, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce, will act as supporting agencies for various phases of the program of the National Peace Agency.

The following may be taken as illustrating the kinds of programs to be undertaken by the Agency, naturally in cooperation and consultation with other national and international agencies when appropriate:

1. Research and development bearing upon the science and technology of nuclear test monitoring, including seismology, atmospheric sampling and detection of electromagnetic radiation.

2. Design, engineering and testing of experimental systems for monitoring nuclear tests, including subsurface, atmospheric and space detonations.

3. Research and development relating to systems and instruments for detecting and identifying missile and satellite tests.

4. Design, engineering and testing of experimental systems for monitoring missile and satellite tests.

5. Development and testing of satellites for monitoring nuclear tests in cosmic space.

6. Research and development in the techniques of aerial reconnaissance inspection.

7. A broad program of research and development relating to overall problems of disarmament, arms limitations and inspection and control systems.

8. Development and application of communications and advanced computer techniques for analyzing the problems involved in inspection of national budgets and economic indicators as they bear upon disarmament inspection systems.

9. Development of new analytic organizations (similar to those described in Sec. 5) for the purposes of:

   a. Applying the techniques of operations research to peace problems in the same way that "war gaming" is conducted for the military problems.

   b. Generating new ideas and concepts applicable to systems and techniques for arms limitation.

   c. Conducting general disarmament studies.

10. Support of studies and research on projects such as:

   a. Techniques for limiting the use of space for military purposes.

   b. Techniques associated with communications systems for inspection purposes.

   c. Techniques relating to conventional armament inspection and detection systems.

   d. Inspection techniques involved in limited warfare situations.

   e. Surprise attack detection systems.

   f. Monitoring techniques appropriate to the submarine problem.

   g. Legal aspects of national sovereignty extended to the space domain and freedom of the seas.

   h. Analyses of the effects of disarmament agreements upon national economies.

   i. Scientific and technical problems of underdeveloped nations.

11. Investigate on a continuing basis the broad aspects of the effects of radiation upon man. With the increasing contamination of this planet's environment and the potential contamination of other planets, it is imperative to know the overall implications of radioactive contamination for man.

12. Research on educational techniques aimed at rendering underdeveloped nations less technologically dependent.

13. Research and development on the food production problems of underdeveloped nations including the improvement of crop yields, development of new agricultural products, and improvement of food storage and preservation techniques.

14. Research and development in conservation of water (including desalination of sea and brackish water) and mineral resources for underdeveloped countries.

15. Development of practical power-generating systems suitable for application to the agricultural and early industrial needs of underdeveloped countries.

16. Research and development on medical problems peculiar to the requirements of underdeveloped countries.

17. Initiation of studies and research in such problem areas as:

    a. Overpopulation, including acceptable methods for dealing with the problems of over-rapid population expansion. These studies will embrace analyses of national and world resources for food, power and ore production.

    b. Determination of the proper technical levels at which aid to underdeveloped nations should be applied and specification of the optimum manner in which such aid may be applied.

    c. Collection and analysis of information on the scientific and technical problems of the various underdeveloped countries.

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A MANO

CONFIDENCIAL

8 de diciembre de 1959
Nuestro 15to Año

Sr. Hirám Torres Rigual
La Fortaleza
San Juan, Puerto Rico

Estimado amigo:

Le acompaño otra idea que se me ha ocurrido en relación con la campaña que hay que hacer para que el público comprenda a cabalidad los grandes riesgos económicos que envuelve la idea de la estadidad federada.

Si don Luis quisiera discutir éstas y otras ideas que tengo, con gusto iré por ésa cuando ustedes así lo ordenen.

Cordialmente,

Samuel

S. E. Badillo
Presidente

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